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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MU.TON L. WEILENMAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
GRANT BLACKHURST MORRELL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12421 
BRIEF O,F APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of a two car intersection accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a judgment on a jury verdict 
for plaintiff in the amount of $12,782.50. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the lower court judg-
ment and an order directing the lower court to grant 
judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or, in the al-
ternative, a new trial. 
1 
the 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be 
lower court. All 
ref erred to as they app d . eare in 
dicated otherwise. 
italics have been added 1 . ' un ess 1n. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on the morning of Oc. 
tober 18, 1968, plaintiff was traveling south down l 
Street on his way to a political breakfast (R. 160). He 
had used this same route to go to work every day for 
over two years. At that hour it was still dark necessitating 
use of the automobile headlights (R. 161). As heap-
proached the intersection of 11th A venue with I Stretr 
he looked to the right, noticed that there was no traffic 
at the stop sign on his right and continued into the inrer· 
section (R. 163). He did not look further up 11th Avenue 
to ascertain if there was traffic approaching the intersec· 
tion though the visibility is such that he could have seen 
for at least one block (R. 188). The defendant's auro-
mobile would have been somewhere on that block at tht 
time plaintiff limited his lookout to the area of the stop 
sign. 
Plaintiff related at trial that the next thing be re· · 
membered after was the noise of the collision with the 1' 
defendant's car (R. 163). Mr. Morrell, the defendant. 
was knocked unconscious by the impact. His last recol· 1 
lection was driving east on 11th A venue at 40 miles an , 
· · h t be was · hour with his lights on low beam recogmzmg t a 1 
. · d k · that he should stop i approachmg a stop sign an nowing : 
at I Street (R. 201). ' 
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The investigating officer found that the light switches 
in both vehicles were pulled to the "on" position and that 
tht: brakes in both vehicles were operational (R. 152). 
There was no witness who could testify whether Mr. 
Morrell had stopped at the stop sign. 
The only evidence whether plaintiff in fact saw the 
defendant's car was plaintiff's recollection that there was 
a street light at the intersection (R. 163) when in fact 
the only illumination would have come from the auto-
mobiles' headlights (R. 158). 
The impact of the accident threw defendant's car in 
the direction of plaintiff's travel where it finally came to 
rest some 5 7 .6 feet from the southeast boundary of 11th 
Avenue. Plaintiff's car stopped approximately on the 
southeast corner of the intersection. See Exhibit 1-P. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR FAILING TO 
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT. ,,. 
It is well-settled law that a driver who looks and 
fails to see the obvious, or fails to look, is negligent as a 
matter of law. 
The case of Johnson v. Syme, 6 Utah 2d 319, 313 
P.2d 468 (1957), is on all fours with the present matter. 
In Johnson the plaintiff was driving on a four-lane divid-
3 
ed highway in the nighttime. The defenda , d 
nt s ecc'C!eni 
entered onto the highway from the plaintiff' · h . 
• S rig t With. 
out stoppmg or slowing down for the stop · d . . 
sign es1gned 
to protect highway traffic and was struck b th . 
"ff' . . Y e plain. 
t1 s car. At trial the plamtiff admitted b · 
. . . erng ven 
familiar wtth the intersection and stated th t h · a s e sa~ 
nothing ~ntil th_e car in which Mr. Syme was killed ap. 
peared directly m front of her at a distance of 20 to 
111 
feet. . 
On the above facts this court stated: 
"Under such conditions we cannot but con· 
elude that plaintiff either looked and failed to set 
the obvious or failed to look at all and, as a matter 
of law negligently contributed to her own injurie1 
and the death of another motorist." 313 P.2a 
at 469. 
This case presents the same essential elements found 
tn Johnson: the accident occurred during darkness IR 
161), plaintiff was on the favored road and defendant on 
the disfavored road, plaintiff was familiar with the inre1· 
section (R. 183) and the plaintiff struck the defendanr'1 
automobile as the latter entered the intersection from the 
plaintiff's right (R. 163). 
In ] ohnson the plaintiff never saw the defendant un· 
til it was too late to avoid the accident. In this case tbr 
plaintiff admitted having never seen the defendant un~ 
. 11 . · (R 163) At trial D< actually involved m the co 1Slon · · 
stated: 
"I looked to the right and to the left, thencotbo· 
· · I then beard ' tinued through the 10tersect10n. 
4 
noise of the collision and that was the extent of 
my knowledge of what occurred." (R. 163) 
Also at trial plaintiff asserted that his duty with re-
~pcct to the defendant ended at his looking to see if any 
automobile was stopped at the stop sign as he approached 
the intersection. He stated: 
"My responsibility was to look at that stop 
sign and see if there was a car at that stop sign." 
(R.186) 
* * * 
"I saw no car at the stop sign. I was not con-
cerned whether or not there was a car behind the 
stop sign because the stop sign was there. I had 
gone down the road day after day for better than 
two years, and had the right to assume that if there 
was a car beyond that stop sign-" (R. 185) 
Plaintiff's legal duty did not end with a simple glance 
to see if any traffic was at the stop sign. Obviously the 
stop sign itself is incapable of preventing a car from pass-
ing through without stopping. Indeed it was possible for 
the plaintiff to see traffic conditions for a distance of at 
lc:a>t one block up I I th A venue (R 188). It cannot be 
disputed but what the defendant was somewhere on that 
block, at the stop sign, or already in the intersection. 
Plaintiff therefore failed to see what was there before 
his eyes. 
The reason why the law requires one to keep a proper 
lookout is to place upon every driver the duty to avoid 
accidents. As such, a lookout like that given by plaintiff 
ivhich ends at the simple determination of which street 
5 
has the favored traffic flow does not fulf'll h 
. t t e duty of 
keepmg a proper lookout. 
, In Co~klin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P.Zd 41• 
( 1948), this Court held, on facts similar to th e present 
matter, that: 
"The duty to keep a proper lookout appliei 
as well to the favored as to the disfavored d ·. 
N . h d . mer ett er river can excuse his own failure to ob: 
serve because the other driver failed in his du~. 
* * * 
"There is still a duty on the part of the driver 
traveling the arterial highway to remain reason· 
ably alert to the possibility of the disfavored driver 
starting across the intersection in the belief that 
he can cross in safety." 193 P.2d at 439. 
Because the plaintiff admitted he could have seen 
further up 11th Avenue than the area of the stop sigi: 
to which he limited his lookout and because plaintiff 
never saw the obvious in that he admitted he was actualh 
involved in the collision when he first saw defendanr' 
automobile, plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. 
Defendant's Motion to this effect before the trial cour1 
was denied <°R. 194). That denial constituted reversible 
error. 
For other cases relevant to this issue see Minqris 1 
Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495 (1949); Co~ 1 
Thompson 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 1047 0953); Coi·mg· 
' ;61· 
ton v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P.2d 788 (19 · 
Hickok v. Skinner 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 5l4 09481; 
Martin v. Ehlers, 1
1
3 Utah 2d 236, 371 P.2d 851 09
62
' 
6 
b 
JnJ J3emon v. D & R G Western RR, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 
P.2d 790 (1955). 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDIOAL ER-
ROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16. 
Instruction No. 16 was submitted by plaintiff (R. 
S(1I. It reads: 
You are instructed that when the law says 
that one person has the right-of-way over another, 
it simply means that such person has the im-
mediate privilege of occupying the space in ques-
tion and other persons must yield to such person. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant either entered the inter-
section without stopping at the stop sign or stop-
ped first and then failed to yield the right-of-way, 
you are instructed that you must find said defen-
dant was negligent. If you further find that such 
negligence proximately caused damages to the 
plaintiff, Milton L. Weilenmann, then you must 
find the issues in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant and assess damages in accordance with 
these instructions, unless you further find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was 
himself guilty of negligence which proximately 
caused his own damages. (R. 61). 
This instruction told the jury the defendant was 
negligent if he entered the intersection without stopping. 
It constituted prejudicial error because it presented to the 
Jury an issue for which there was no evidence: There was 
no witness who could say whether the defendant had 
stopped at the stop sign. Mr. Morrell was knocked un-
7 
conscious by the impact and had no recoil . · ect1on whetht, 
he had stopped before entering the intersectio H · n. e die 
recall that there was a stop sign ahead and th t h · a e 1nrena 
ed to stop at this intersection (R. 201). 
It is the law of this state that instructions should f:· 
the facts of the case. Johnson v. Cornwall Wareh Oli!t 
Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 25 (1965). It is furthe: 
the law that, 
"A choice of probabilities creates only a basi. 
for conjecture on which a verdict of a jury cannn: 
stand. 
* * * 
"One may only speculate as to the circum 
stances immediately p r i o r to the collision.' 
DeMille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 378, 462 P.!: 
159, 161-62 (1969) 
In addition, Instruction No. 16 was prejudicial be 
cause it failed to tell the jury that if the defendant enteree 
the intersection first, and at a time when Mr. Weilenmanr 
was not so close as to constitute an immediate hazari 
the defendant and not Mr. Weilenmann had the right0i 
way. 
This principle of law is found in the Utah Mow: 
Vehicle Code: 
41-6-7 4. Vehicle entering a through higD-
way. - [(a)] The driver of a vehicle shall sti': 
as required bv this act at the entrance to a throut 
highway and' shall yield the right of way toot' 
8 
• 
vehicles which have entered the intersection from 
said highway or which are approaching so closely 
0 11 wid through highway to constitute an immedi-
ate hazard, but said driver having so yielded may 
proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles ap-
proaching the intersection on said through high-
way shall yield the right of way to the vehicle so 
proceeding into or across the through highway. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop 
in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at 
an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one 
or more entrances thereto although not a part of 
a !hrough l-'.i.'.;hway and shall proceed cautiously, 
yield right of way to vehicles not so obliged to 
stop which are within the intersection or approach-
i11g so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
hut t'f'ay then proceed. 
Without stating the full requirements of the statute 
the instruction had the effect of stating the defendant's 
entrance into the intersection controlled by a stop sign 
and involvement in an accident amounted to prima 
facie evidence that plaintiff had the right of way. This 
court specifically held in Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse 
Co., 15 Utah 2d 172, 389 P.2d 710 (1964), that such an 
instruction was prejudicial. 
Under Johnson the jury should not have been allow-
ed to find the defendant negligent without first inquir-
ing whether the plaintiff was in the intersection or so 
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard to 
defendant's entering or proceeding into the intersection. 
9 
Because nowhere in the charge were th . 
• d . e Jurors S<J 
mstructe , Instruct10n No. 16 was dul b' • Y o Jected to a, 
was lnstruct10n No. 20 for the same reason (R 2• • )9·6!1 
The error in giving this instruction e 1 d' . . . xc u ing ai 
important principle of Utah law was likely aggravat~ 
when plaintiff's counsel in summation stated L , as to tut 
plaintiff: 
. "[H]ad ~e actually seen that automobile nt 
still had the right to continue along that highwa · 
(R.112) )· 
The defendant submits that leaving the jury free 11 
speculate on the facts and then apply them to an incom 
plete rule of law was prejudicial error. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER· 
ROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 19. 
Instruction No. 19 was plaintiff's requested Insuu1 
tion No. 6 (R. 87). It states: 
You are instructed that a driver on a St!('f. 
protected by stop signs has the right-of-way 01 ~ 
traffic approaching on the cross-street and has tli 
right to assume that such traffic will not enter tli 
intersection against the stop signal. ~e may.~ 
tinue to rely upon such an assumpt10n unul 
sees or in the exercise of reasonable care sboul: 
hav~ seen, that the other vehicle is going to pn• 
ceed against the signal. (R. 64) 
· 6 d 2ot1u' 
The impression given by Instrucuons 1 an •. · 
· ' hides wou;. 
any accident occurring between the parties ve 
10 
be due to the negligence of defendant because he was on 
rhe srreet with the stop sign was aggravated by Instruc-
tion No. 19. 
This instruction was offered by plaintiff (R. 87). It 
appears to have been fabricated in part from JIFU 21.18. 
Indeed the last sentence is taken almost verbatim from 
that JIFU instruction. 
It is significant to note that the JIFU instruction is 
for one based on an intersection controlled by traffic sig-
nals as opposed to stop signs. While the first part of 
Instruction No. 19 uses the terminology stop sign, stop 
signal or signal is the terminology of the remainder of 
the instruction. 
It is significant that this instruction was taken from 
JIFU 21.18 in showing that it established a misleading 
standard. The last four words of the instruction "pro-
reed against the signal" is proper only when applied to a 
traffic semaphore situation. In such situations it is im-
proper to proceed into the intersection against a red light. 
However, on an intersection controlled only by a stop 
sign, one is not negligent for entering an intersection 
controlled by a stop sign. A stop sign is not the equiva-
lent of a continuous red stop light . 
• 
Instruction No. 19 may correctly state the law with 
respect to traffic signals; it is misleading and incomplete 
as to intersections controlled by stop signs. 
11 
4i 
Technically one does not proceed · against a stop . 
unless there is other traffic in or so near th . sig: . e 10tersecoo· 
as to constitute an immediate hazard Th' · " . . . · is 1nstructM 
gives the impress10n that any entrance to th · . e llltersecno· 
by the defendant is negligence and "against th · 
1 
e signal 
This instruction shows the danger of fab · · . . r1catrng, 
JU?' ~nstruction f~om another based upon different lega 
principles. Especially in the context of other legallr in 
complete instructions it cannot be said that such a~:~ 
struction accomplished the object of enlightening the jur. 
on their problems, ] ohnson v. Cornwall Ware house (1, 
16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24 (1965), but merely added 1 
the confusion. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents an important question of puol 
policy: Can the duty of every motorist to keep a pro~: 
lookout in order to avoid accidents be fully satisfied f 
a mere glance towards the intersection to assure he is 1r 
the favored street? Defendant submits that one's dui 
of proper lookout cannot be thus satisfied. 
Though plaintiff could easily have seen all them 
fie to his right for over one block's distance he mac. 
no effort to ascertain if there was any traffic behind c 
area immediately adjacent to the stop sign. It is beiK 
dispute that defendant's automobile was somewher~wic 
in that one block area when the plaintiff made his fll'' 
· h h plaintiff f~k 
ing glance. It logically follows t at t e 
12 
ro observe what was plainly visible. This was negligence 
,is a matter of law. 
The jury could only have avoided finding the plain-
riff negligent as a matter of law upon incomplete or mis-
leading instructions. Failure of the trial court to properly 
instruct the jury according to the standards set forth by 
the Utah statutes laid the groundwork for the jury's im-
proper verdict excusing the plaintiff from his duty to 
.:xcrcise a proper lookout. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Raymond M. Berry 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
7th Floor Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
13 
MAILING NOTICE 
I hereby certify I mailed two copies of the foregoU. 
brief, postage prepaid, to John L. Black, 530 JudgeB~ 
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of MJr, 
1971. 
